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It’s About Time: The Long
Overdue Demise of Statutes of
Repose in Latent Toxic Tort
Litigation
Jean Macchiaroli Eggen†
Abstract
Latent toxic illness typically does not become manifest until
months, years, or decades after a person’s exposure to a toxic
substance. The timing, extent, and characteristics of its physical manifestation are unpredictable and vary among individuals. Similarly,
property damages associated with environmental contamination may
not be detected for years, and the diseases caused by the contamination could take even longer to manifest. Accordingly, toxic harms
present unique challenges for plaintiffs confronted with time limitations on their actions. Statutes of repose operate in conjunction with
statutes of limitations to provide defendants with maximum
protection from stale claims. Unlike statutes of limitations, however,
they run from an event external to the plaintiff’s injury, such as the
sale of a product or the completion of an improvement to real property. Even if the statute of limitations has not yet expired, the
plaintiff’s claim may nevertheless be barred if it is brought after the
repose period. Plaintiffs whose latent illnesses take longer to become
detectable are likely to be time-barred; conversely, those who get sick
sooner, i.e. before the repose period expires, may bring their claims.
This Article examines the ways in which statutes of repose—and their
narrow judicial interpretations—negatively impact latent-illness
claimants. The Article demonstrates that to date any attempts by
state legislatures to remedy this situation have fallen short. This
Article concludes that the best solution is the simplest one—an
absolute statutory exclusion for claims based on latent injuries.
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Introduction
Plaintiffs with latent toxic injury claims often encounter substantive and procedural doctrines that bar recovery even when the
merits of their claims seem to demand a remedy. Latent toxic illness
is insidious, and the timing, extent, and characteristics of its physical
manifestation are unpredictable. Thus, toxic injuries provide the
states with unique challenges in formulating time limitations for
bringing tort actions—through statutes of limitations and statutes of
repose—while at the same time accomplishing the policy goals underlying the time limits. Toxic injury typically does not become manifest
until a date significantly later than the time of the plaintiff’s exposure
to the toxic substance. For example, asbestos-related illness may not
manifest until years or decades after the plaintiff’s last exposure.1
Similarly, property damages associated with environmental contamination may not be detected for years, and the diseases caused by the
contamination could take even longer to manifest.2
1.

See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.15 (5th
Cir. 1973) (discussing studies conducted during the 1950s and 1960s
examining the occurrence of asbestosis in asbestos insulation workers); see
also Dan Fagin, Toms River: A Story of Science and Salvation
260–67 (2013) (discussing the triggers of carcinogenesis).

2.

One of the earliest and most dramatic examples was the so-called “Love
Canal” environmental disaster site, which generated evacuations, remediation,
and decades of litigation. See generally, Lessons from Love Canal: A Public
Health Resource, B.U. (2003), http://www.bu.edu/lovecanal/main2.html
[https://perma.cc/5MGV-J6V8] (providing a history of the contamination,
community action, and remediation at the site, extending over many years).
This Article employs the terms “latent illness” and “latent toxic injury”
throughout, but in certain contexts the terms are intended to encompass
property contamination by toxic substances that could cause illness.
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Statutes of limitations are ubiquitous, and their impact is well
understood. Although nearly all the states and the District of
Columbia have some form of tort statute of repose, these statutes,
which may impose an absolute bar on some actions, are less conspicuous. Their impact on certain claims is either poorly understood
or simply ignored by state legislatures. Statutes of repose operate in
conjunction with, but in a manner different from, statutes of limitations. While personal injury statutes of limitations begin to run at
the time the action accrues—typically when the injury to the plaintiff
occurs—statutes of repose run from a designated point in time
external to the plaintiff, such as the manufacture and sale of a
product.3 The state legislature defines in the first instance the act that
triggers the running of the repose period. This act may have occurred
years, or even decades, before the action accrues. The most common
statutes of repose run for a fixed period of time from the sale of a
product4 or from the completion of an improvement to real property.5
Both types apply directly to latent toxic injury claims, the former to
toxic product claims and the latter to environmental contamination
claims and their associated personal injuries. When a statute of repose
applies to the case in addition to a statute of limitations, the
plaintiff’s action must be timely under both statutes. Thus, a plaintiff
may be time-barred by the statute of repose even if the claim has not
yet accrued under the statute of limitations.6
In the 1970s and 1980s, the states began to recognize the unfairness of applying a strict statute of limitations, which typically ran
from the last exposure to the toxic substance, in latent illness cases,
leading to revision of their arbitrary rules to accommodate plaintiffs
3.

The United States Supreme Court has defined a statute of repose as placing
“an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action [that] is measured not from
the date on which the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last
culpable act or omission of the defendant.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S.
Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014). The Court called it “an ‘absolute . . . bar’ on a
defendant’s temporal liability.” Id. at 2183 (citation omitted); cf. California
Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Anz Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2050 (2017)
(reasserting the concept of absolute bar in deciding that the petitioner, which
had opted out of a class action settlement, was barred by a federal statute of
repose from maintaining a subsequent individual action).

4.

See, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b)(2) (2017) (running for ten years from the
date of “delivery” of the product).

5.

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-108(a) (West 2011)
(running for twenty years from when the improvement is first available for its
intended use).

6.

Conversely, unless the legislature provides otherwise by extending the accrual
date, the claim could be barred by the statute of limitations before the period
in the statute of repose expires. “Discovery” statutes of limitations are
pervasive now, however, thus minimizing the likelihood of this scenario.
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whose injuries manifested much later. The impetus for many of these
statutory changes was the mass litigation arising from exposures to
diethylstilbestrol (“DES”), the prescription drug given to pregnant
women from the 1940s to the 1970s to prevent miscarriages.7 Latent
injuries to the offspring of women who ingested DES during pregnancy included signature cancers and other reproductive injuries that
typically manifested years after birth and into adulthood, well after
both the initial exposure to DES in utero and the birth of the
offspring.8 When these illnesses manifested they were long past the
time allowed by the relevant statute of limitations for commencing a
personal injury action. For reasons of fairness, the states eventually
embraced “discovery” limitations periods9 for DES claims and other
claims based upon latent toxic injuries, pursuant to which the action
is deemed to have accrued when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the injury.10
Although the states have uniformly embraced discovery statutes
of limitations for latent disease claims, many states have remained intransigent in enforcing their repose statutes. Courts have routinely
applied statutes of repose strictly and arbitrarily, with harsh results
for plaintiffs. For example, in In re Depakote: Alexander v. Abbott
Laboratories, Inc.,11 the court conducted a choice of law analysis and
7.

See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1989)
(discussing the statute of limitations problems associated with DES-related
illness).

8.

See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. 1982) (discussing
the connection between pre-natal DES exposure and cancer).

9.

See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 2003) (running the three-year
statute of limitations “from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff
or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury
should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier,” in cases
involving latent injury); Moll v. Abbott Labs., 506 N.W.2d 816, 823–24
(Mich. 1993) (interpreting the Michigan discovery statute of limitations to
apply to pharmaceutical product liability claims).

10.

See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.8(a) (West 2006). In California, for
actions based upon exposures to “a hazardous material or toxic substance,”
the statute of limitations:
shall be no later than either two years from the date of injury, or two
years after the plaintiff becomes aware of, or reasonably should have
become aware of, (1) an injury, (2) the physical cause of the injury,
and (3) sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice
that the injury was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act of
another, whichever occurs later.
Id.

11.

No. 12–CV–52–NJR–SCW, 2017 WL 1326964 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2017), on
recons., No. 12–CV–52–NJR–SCW, 2017 WL 3116238 (S.D. Ill. July 21,
2017).
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concluded that the Indiana product liability statute of repose barred
the minor plaintiffs’ claims for birth defects arising from in utero
exposures to the defendant’s prescription drug, Depakote, ingested by
their mothers during pregnancy.12 Although Illinois—the other state
with interests in the litigation—also had a statute of repose, it
contained a tolling provision for minors, which would have benefited
the plaintiffs.13 The court was not persuaded, however, by the
plaintiffs’ argument that Illinois law should apply because of its policy
interest in protecting minors from harsh results and ruled instead that
the Indiana bar should apply.14
Even in cases in which the relevant discovery statute of
limitations is sufficiently broad to accommodate the plaintiff’s
claims—and where the equities of the case demand a remedy—the
statute of repose has often barred the claim. Consider, hypothetically,
a state that has a discovery statute of limitations for personal injuries
that runs for three years from the time that the plaintiff knows of the
injury and also knows of its likely cause. The same jurisdiction has a
statute of repose for product liability claims that runs for ten years
from the date on which the defendant sold the product to the initial
consumer. Assume the plaintiff brings a product liability personal
injury claim against the defendant product seller less than three years
after her undisputed diagnosis and knowledge of causal connection to
the defendant’s product. But the claim happens to be commenced
twenty years from the time the product was first sold because the
plaintiff’s illness took many years to manifest. Clearly the plaintiff
would not be barred by the statute of limitations, but, absent an
exception, the claim is absolutely barred by the ten-year statute of
repose.
The states are not unaware of this problem, and some have
struggled with the inherent unfairness of applying statutes of repose
to latent injury claims. Although the states have uniformly embraced
the concept of discovery statutes of limitations to address this
problem, those states with statutes of repose have largely done little
to fully alleviate the disability that repose places on latent injury
plaintiffs who are unfortunate enough to have their injuries manifest
after the expiration of the repose period. Several state courts have
flatly rejected the harsh and arbitrary bar of statutes of repose on

12.

Id. at *4.

13.

Id. at *5; see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-213(d) (West 2011)
invalidated by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1105–06 (Ill.
1997) (tolling the period of limitations until the person turns eighteen or is no
longer under a legal disability).

14.

In re Depakote, 2017 WL 1326964, at *6–7.
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state constitutional grounds.15 On the other end of the spectrum are
the states that continue to tolerate the inequities of their repose
statutes in the service of absolute protection of certain business interests and activities. In between these extremes are the states that
have undertaken ad hoc efforts, resulting in a hodge-podge of insufficient state rules enacted incrementally and favoring certain toxic
tort plaintiffs over others. Where a statute of repose applies to some
or all latent toxic injury cases, the difference between a viable claim
and one that is time-barred may simply be the fortuity of one
plaintiff’s illness manifesting a day before the illness of another
plaintiff.
With these considerations in mind, this Article argues that latent
toxic injury cases have unique characteristics that make it fundamentally unfair to apply statutes of repose in most cases. These
considerations substantially outweigh any need for shielding defendants from stale claims and unexpected liabilities. Accordingly, states
determined to retain their statutes of repose for at least some claims
should enact an absolute exclusion for latent illness claims. Part I of
this Article provides a brief overview of the types of statutes of repose
that appear in latent toxic injury litigation, demonstrating the harsh
results of a strict interpretation of the statutes and examining the
typical justifications for these callous rules. Part II surveys some of
the ways that states have chipped away at their repose statutes for
latent illness claims, including judicial rulings on their constitutionality, and demonstrates the inadequacy of those attempts. Part III
seeks an effective solution to the problem and shows that even those
few states that have enacted broad exceptions for latent injuries simply do not go far enough. Ultimately, this Article concludes that only
an absolute exclusion for latent injury claims will suffice to avoid the
disability that statutes of repose impose upon toxic tort plaintiffs.

I.

An Overview of the Problem

Statutes of repose operate in conjunction with statutes of limitations to provide maximum protection for defendants. Traditionally,
personal injury actions were deemed to accrue for statute of
limitations purposes at the time the tort occurs, which was when the
plaintiff suffered injury.16 Two events—the defendant’s act and the
plaintiff’s injury—typically occurred at or around the same time, as
with most motor vehicle accidents, for example. The full extent of the
plaintiff’s injury might not be known at the time of the defendant’s
15.

See infra notes 62–77 and accompanying text.

16.

See Dan B. Dobbs et al., Hornbook on Torts § 18.2, at 429 (2d ed.
2016).
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act, but the fact that the plaintiff suffered an injury was known.
Statutes of limitations did not originally contemplate latent illness
cases, in which the time between the defendant’s action, the plaintiff’s
exposure to a toxic substance, and the first manifestation of an illness
caused by that exposure could stretch for years or decades. Courts
and legislatures eventually relented on the arbitrary bar of statutes of
limitations by introducing the “discovery” concept for latent illness.
The New Hampshire statute of limitations for “personal actions,” excludeing defamation, contains typical language:
[The action] may be brought only within 3 years of the act or
omission complained of, except that when the injury and its
causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered
and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of
the act or omission, the action shall be commenced within 3
years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its
causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.17

A few jurisdictions have crafted specific discovery statutes for latent
harms associated with specific toxic exposures, such as hazardous
chemicals.18 All discovery statutes of limitations recognize the fundamental unfairness of barring a plaintiff’s claim before the plaintiff
knew or could have known of the illness.
In contrast, statutes of repose run from the time of a particular
act by the defendant, such as the sale of a product,19 the designation
17.

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4(I) (2010).

18.

See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577c (West 2013), amended by 2015
Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 15-67 (West). The Connecticut statute of limitations
provides a discovery rule for claims due to “exposure to a hazardous chemical
substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant.” Id. (running two years from the
date when the injury was discovered or reasonably could have been discovered).
The New York discovery statute of limitations for “latent effects of exposure to
any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within the
body or upon or within property” is broader, including products and biological
substances. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c(2) (McKinney 2003). Although the New York
statute allows the plaintiff time to ascertain the cause of the illness and thereby
identify the defendant, the plaintiff’s task becomes more onerous as time goes on,
and eventually a final repose is imposed. Id. 214-c(4).

19.

See Ala. Code § 6-5-502(c) (2014), invalidated by Lankford v. Sullivan,
Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-551 (2016), invalidated by Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861 P.2d
625, 630 (Ariz. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(a) (West 2013);
Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (2017); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (2007);
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-213(b) (West 2011), invalidated by Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1105–06 (Ill. 1997); Ind. Code § 3420-3-1 (2017); Iowa Code § 614.1(2A) (2017); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 411.310(1) (West 2017); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-224(2) (2016); N.H. Rev.
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of the product’s useful safe life,20 the completion of an improvement to
real property,21 or the time of a particular medical treatment,22
Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2(II)(a) (2010), invalidated by Heath v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-46.1 (2015); N.D.
Cent. Code § 28-01.3-08(1) (2016), invalidated by Dickie v. Farmers Union
Oil Co. of LaMoure, 611 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2305.10(C) (West 2004); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905 (2015); 9 R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 9-1-13(b) (West 2006), invalidated by Kennedy v. Cumberland
Eng’g Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a)
(2012); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.012(b) (West 2002);
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(5) (2015–16).
20.

See e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(c) (West 2013), amended by
2017 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 17-97 (H.B. 7194) (West) (allowing an exception
to the statute of repose for plaintiffs who can prove that the harm occurred
during the useful safe life of the product); Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (2017);
Idaho Code § 6-1403(1) (2010); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(b)(1) (2005);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(13) (West 2013) (stating if the
product has been in use for ten years or more, the plaintiff loses any
presumptions that otherwise would apply); Minn. Stat. § 604.03 (2017);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a) (2012); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 7.72.060(1)(a), (2) (2017).

21.

See e.g., Ala. Code § 6-5-218(a) (2014), invalidated by Jackson v.
Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Alaska Stat.
Ann. § 09.10.055(a) (2007); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-552(A) (2016);
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-112 (West 2013); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§§ 337.1, 337.15 (West 2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-104 (2017); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-584a (West 2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8127
(2016); D.C. Code § 12-310 (2001); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(c) (2017); Ga.
Code Ann. § 9-3-51 (2017); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 657-8 (West 2008);
Idaho Code § 5-241 (2010); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-214 (West
2011), amended by 2014 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-1131 (S.B. 2221) (West);
Ind. Code § 32-30-1-5(d) (2017); Iowa Code § 614.1(11)(a) (2017); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.135 (West 2017), invalidated by Perkins v. Ne. Log
Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991); La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2772(A)(1) (2005);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 752-A (2003); Md. Code Ann., Cts. &
Jud. Proc. § 5-108(a) (West 2011); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B
(2016); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5839 (West 2013); Minn. Stat.
§ 541.051 (2017); Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-41 (West 2013); Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 516.097 (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-208 (2017); Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§ 11.202, 11.2055 (2016); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-b (2010);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1.1 (West 2015); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-27
(West 2010); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(f) (2015); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 28-01-44 (2016); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.131 (West 2004); Okla.
Stat. tit. 12, § 109 (2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.135(1) (2015); 42 Pa.
Stat. and Cons. Ann. § 5536 (West 2004); 9 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 91-29 (West 2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640 (2017); S.D. Codified
Laws §§ 15-2A-3 to -9 (2014); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-3-202 to -205 (West
2012); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 16.008 to .009(a) (West
2002); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(4) (LexisNexis 2012); Va. Code
Ann. § 8.01-250 (West 2017); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.310 (2017); W.
Va. Code Ann. § 55-2-6a (West 2002), amended by 2015 W. Va. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 2; Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (2015–16); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-3-111
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regardless of when the plaintiff suffered injury. The Georgia product
liability statute, for example, provides that “[n]o action shall be
commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after
ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the
personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.”23
Pennsylvania’s real property improvements statute of repose provides
that actions for property damage or personal injury against developers, contractors, or architects of a real property improvement may not
be brought more than twelve years after “construction of such
improvement.”24 Thus, a repose provision sets an arbitrary outside
limit on all claims, even if the person has not yet discovered the basis
for the claim.25
Statutes of repose such as these were the darlings of the tort
reform movement in the late twentieth century, touted by reformists
bent on protecting business and industry from tort lawsuits.26 With
plaintiff-friendly developments such as the abrogation of the privity
requirement and the expansion of strict product liability, legislatures
and courts solidified these arbitrary time limits to even the playing
field.27 Architects, engineers, and building contractors felt the same
pressure as product sellers from the abandonment of privity28 in acto -113 (West 2007); see also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-223 (2016) (running
from “the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action”); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-52(16) (2015) (stating the general tort claim statute of repose),
amended by H.B. No. 436, 2017 Gen. Assembly (N.C.).
22.

See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-18(3) (2016); Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-3-404(1) (LexisNexis 2012); W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-7B-4 (West
2002), amended by 2017 W. Va. Legis. Serv. Ch. 3. The North Dakota statute
expressly states that the repose period will not be extended for non-discovery
of the injury, unless the non-discovery was caused by the defendant’s fraud.
N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-18(3) (2016). Some medical malpractice statutes
of repose contain an exception for discovery of a foreign object left inside the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 4 (2016). Medical
malpractice repose statutes are outside the scope of this Article, however, as
the injuries typically are not latent illnesses caused by exposure to a toxic
substance.

23.

Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (2007).

24.

42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Ann. § 5536(a) (West 2004).

25.

See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2187 (2014).

26.

Dobbs Et Al., supra note 16, § 18.4, at 433.

27.

See id.; cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1994). The
Georgia Supreme Court noted that the stabilization of the product liability
insurance underwriting market was a goal of the statute of repose, which
applied to both strict liability and negligence actions. Id.

28.

See, e.g., Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding that
privity of contract no longer applied to negligence claims against a building
contractor).
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tions against them for improvements to real property.29 Furthermore,
those engaged in building design and construction resented what they
viewed as the unfairness of the discovery statutes of limitations and
lobbied for the kind of finite limit on litigation that a statute of repose would impose.30
Some state legislatures have included in their statutes of repose
the policies they hoped repose would advance. To this end, for example, the Utah legislature provided a list of general “findings” in the
state’s statute of repose for claims related to improvements to real
property.31 This list reflects the universal policy justifications for
statutes of repose in all contexts. The Utah legislature first expressed
the view that after a certain length of time, “the possibility of injury
or damage . . . become[s] highly remote,” which results in “unexpected[] . . . costs and hardships” for the defendant.32 Ultimately, the
legislature stated, the possibility of injury becomes too “remote and
unexpected” more than seven years from the completion of the
improvement,33 presumably diminishing any perceived unfairness to
plaintiffs. The statute identifies certain “undue and unlimited liability
risks” that include, but are not limited to, the cost of liability
insurance, the cost of document storage, and the hardship of defending against claims brought many years after a project is finished.34
Not to put too fine a point on it, the legislature stated that “these
costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils.”35
Essentially, these justifications amount to unpredictability and inability to accurately estimate and plan for future costs.
The Alabama legislature articulated a common variation on these
policies, this time referencing product liability litigation:
The Legislature finds that product liability actions and
litigation have increased substantially, and the cost of such
litigation has risen in recent years. The Legislature further finds
that these increases are having an impact upon consumer prices,
and upon the availability, cost, and use of product liability
29.

Michael J. Vardaro & Jennifer E. Waggoner, Note, Statutes of Repose—The
Design Professional’s Defense to Perpetual Liability, 10 St. John’s J.
Legal Comment. 697, 715–16 (1995).

30.

Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725, 728–29 (Ala. 1983)
(holding the Alabama statute of repose for improvements to real property
unconstitutional).

31.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(2) (LexisNexis 2012).

32.

Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(a).

33.

Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(d).

34.

Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(b).

35.

Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(c).
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insurance, thus, affecting the availability of compensation for
injured consumers.36

Thus, Alabama went further than Utah on the tort reform bandwagon, suggesting that even spreading losses through consumer prices
and liability insurance would nevertheless result in such high costs to
defendants that little would be left to compensate injured consumers.
To ameliorate these perceived “social evils,”37 the legislature adopted
a consistent set of limitations and repose rules for all product liability
actions.38
With respect to improvements to real property, the South Dakota
legislature articulated a set of policy justifications for mandating a
repose period which were specifically directed at real property construction projects. The legislature stated that following completion of
a project:
[P]ersons involved in the planning, design, and construction of
improvements to real estate lack control over the determination
of the need for, the undertaking of and the responsibility for
maintenance, and lack control over other forces, uses and
intervening causes which cause stress, strain, wear, and tear to
the improvements and, in most cases, have no right or
opportunity to be made aware of or to evaluate the effect of
these forces on a particular improvement or to take action to
overcome the effect of these forces.39

Accordingly, the statute established an outside limit for actions of ten
years following the substantial completion of a project.40 In the opinion of the legislature, the repose period was “in the public interest and
in the interest of equating the rights of due process between the
prospective litigants.”41
These policies are less explicit in other real property improvement
statutes of repose. A common exception to real property improvement
statutes are claims against the party in possession of the improvement

36.

Ala. Code § 6-5-500 (2014).

37.

Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1001 (Ala. 1982).

38.

Ala. Code § 6-5-500 (“It is the intent of the Legislature that a
comprehensive system consisting of the time for commencement of actions, for
discoverability of actions based upon insidious disease and the repose of
actions shall be instituted in this state.”).

39.

S.D. Codified Laws § 15-2A-1 (2014).

40.

Id.

41.

Id.
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after completion, typically a landowner or tenant.42 This exception
allows claims against parties with continuing control of the improvement and with the ability to maintain and repair it. While the control
justification may be theoretically valid, it completely ignores the practical situation in which a person is exposed to a toxic condition prior
to the expiration of the repose period, but manifests an illness after
the repose period has expired.
Another argument in favor of statutes of repose for claims arising
from improvements to real property is that architectural and
engineering creativity is unfairly restricted by the prospect of
unending litigation.43 Of course, the same could be said for the designers of products, including medical devices, prescription drugs, and
thousands of other products that could result in serious—and
potentially latent—injuries to consumers. This Article posits that the
policy justifications for both product liability and real property improvement statutes of repose are manifestly unfair when the injury
claimed is latent illness.44
The states’ reluctance to reform their statutes of repose is explained by the policies the legislatures have advanced, policies that go
beyond merely assuring an end to anticipated litigation. As the Utah
statute demonstrated, statutes of repose are intended to protect
broader business interests.45 Forcing a business entity to defend a tort
claim beyond a certain fixed time constitutes a “clear social and
economic evil[]” in the legislature’s express view.46 Such hyperbolic
language evinces a strong preference for the interests of business over
the rights of injured parties to compensation. The states may also
have felt the need to even the playing field because of a perceived
advantage that some modern tort doctrines, such as strict product
liability, may have provided to plaintiffs.47 Because statutes of repose
may bar a claim that would otherwise be timely under the statute of

42.

See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337.1(d) (West 2006) (patent defects);
id. § 337.15(e) (latent defects); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-104(3) (2017);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(d) (2015).

43.

Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 29, at 715–16.

44.

See infra notes 114–120, 169–179 and accompanying text.

45.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012).

46.

Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(c).

47.

See Dobbs et al., supra note 16, § 18.4, at 433 (noting that statutes of
repose evolved to provide a procedural replacement for some obsolete
substantive tort doctrines that had shielded some defendants from liability,
such as the privity rule in product liability cases).
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limitations, statutes of repose are the ultimate trump card for defendants.48
A close examination of the interaction of a statute of repose and a
statute of limitations in a toxic latent illness case is particularly
instructive. This interaction and its arbitrary result is exemplified by
Montgomery v. Wyeth,49 a case under Tennessee law. Tennessee courts
had long interpreted the personal injury statute of limitations to be a
discovery statute.50 But the state’s product liability statute of repose
added an additional restriction, providing that:
[An action] must be brought within six (6) years of the date of
injury, in any event, the action must be brought within ten (10)
years from the date on which the product was first purchased
for use or consumption, or within one (1) year after the
expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the
shorter.51

In Montgomery, the plaintiff took the defendant’s drug in 1997,
during the short period of time that it was on the market.52 She was
diagnosed with pulmonary hypertension in 2005 and brought a
personal injury action within six months of the diagnosis, well within
the discovery statute of limitations.53 But her personal injury claim
was barred by the accompanying statute of repose.54 Although the
plaintiff brought suit within ten years of her first use or consumption
of the drug, the court held that the “anticipated life” of the product
had expired.55 The Tennessee legislature defined “anticipated life” as
determined by “the ‘expiration date placed on the product by the
manufacturer when required by law.’”56 The Sixth Circuit, affirming
the district court, held that because the expiration date set by Wyeth
48.

The bar can work the other way as well, i.e., a claim timely under the statute
of repose could still be barred if it is beyond the statute of limitations. This
scenario is far less likely to occur in cases involving latent toxic injury subject
to a discovery statute of limitations.

49.

580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009).

50.

See McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn.
1975).

51.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a) (West 2012). The statute contains an
exception for asbestos and silicone gel breast implants. Id. § 29-28-103(b).

52.

Montgomery, 580 F.3d at 458.

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 458–59.

55.

Id. at 467 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(1) (West 2012)).

56.

Id. (quoting § 29-28-102(1)).
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for its drug was three years from the date of manufacture, here 1997,
the statute of repose barred any action brought after September 2000,
regardless of the fact that it was brought within ten years of first
purchase.57 Moreover, the plaintiff did not need to know the expiration date for the action to be barred.58 The court stated: “‘Statutes
of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience
rather than logic . . . . They represent a public policy about the
privilege to litigate.’”59
Montgomery illustrates the inherent unfairness of a statute of
repose and its particular unfairness to latent illness plaintiffs. The
plaintiff’s action was timely under the statute of limitations, but ran
afoul of an especially arbitrary and restrictive clause in the statute of
repose. The determination of the “anticipated life” of the product was
exclusively within the manufacturer’s domain, and the setting of the
expiration date did not require any logical or reasonable basis. The
plaintiff had no control over when she would become ill, placing her
at a decided disadvantage for any legal recovery. Moreover, the statute treated her differently from any plaintiffs who had the fortuity to
develop the same illness earlier in time and within the statute’s
parameters. The message the statute communicates to manufacturers
is to set early expiration dates so as to reduce the number of claims
for latent injuries and receive maximum protection from product
litigation.

II. The Erratic Road to Reform
For decades courts and scholars have been aware of the problems
associated with applying statutes of repose to latent illness,60 but
reform has been sluggish and stunningly inconsistent. Statutes of
repose are creatures of state law, making state courts the ultimate
arbiters of the validity of those statutes. Accordingly, early challengers to statutes of repose brought actions in state court that raised a
variety of constitutional arguments under both state and federal constitutional provisions, and some were successful.61 Although it is
beyond the scope of this Article to examine the substance of these
57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Id. (quoting Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 140 (6th Cir. 1983)).

60.

See, e.g., Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1027–28 (Md.
1983).

61.

See generally Francis E. McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and
Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16
Forum 416, 425–29 (1980).

36

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017
Long Overdue Demise of Statutes of Repose

constitutional challenges in any detail, this Part begins with a brief
overview of some of these cases. The cases demonstrate the tenacity of
the policies underlying statutes of repose and reinforce the inequity of
their application. This Part then examines legislative enactments that
have limited the operation of statutes of repose under some circumstances, but which have been patently inadequate to address the
problem of latent toxic illness.
A.

Early Constitutional Challenges

Objectors have advanced a variety of constitutional arguments,
with mixed and limited results. In Alabama, both the product liability
statute62 and the real property improvements statute63 ran afoul of the
state constitutional provision guaranteeing open courts.64 In holding
that the product liability statute of repose violated this provision, the
Alabama Supreme Court observed that the legislature’s list of “social
evils” that necessitated a repose period bore no substantial relationship to the ten-year statute of repose.65 The court ultimately concluded that “[t]o say that barring claims involving products that have
been used for more than 10 years will eradicate and ease the cost
increases in consumer prices and product liability insurance is unreasonable in our opinion.”66 The court applied the same rationale in
holding the real property improvements statute of repose in violation
of the open courts provision, having rejected an effort to distinguish
real property construction from manufactured products.67
In New Hampshire, the state’s highest court held that the product
liability statute of repose denied plaintiffs equal protection of the
laws, concluding that the repose statute had no reasonable relationship to the state’s objective of reducing product liability insurance

62.

Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982)
(holding Ala. Code § 6-5-502(c) (1975) unconstitutional).

63.

Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725, 728–29 (Ala. 1983)
(holding Ala. Code § 6-5-218(a) (1975) unconstitutional).

64.

Ala. Const. art. I, § 13.

65.

Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1001 (citing Ala. Code § 6-5-500 (1975) (amended
1979)).

66.

Id. The court also stated that the product liability statute was a violation of
due process because “it does not provide for an extension of the limitation
period for someone injured shortly before the expiration period.” Id. at 1003.
The court suggested that the addition of a savings clause to allow claims for
injuries occurring immediately prior to the expiration of the repose period
would rectify the statute. Id. As this Article demonstrates, a savings provision
does not solve the fundamental problem of latent illness claims.

67.

Jackson, 435 So. 2d at 728 (citing Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1002–03).
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costs.68 In Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court reasoned that
“[t]he effect of this absolute limitation on suits against manufacturers
is to nullify some causes of actions before they even arise,”69 meaning
that the injuries suffered by some product plaintiffs will not manifest
until after the expiration of the statute of repose. The court was
especially concerned with the statute’s disparate and arbitrary impact
on product plaintiffs when compared to non-product plaintiffs whose
claims were not subject to the statute of repose.70
Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the general
product liability statute of repose violated the equal protection clause
of the state constitution because “[t]here is simply no demonstration
by the testimony or evidence submitted to the legislature which shows
harm or prejudice to sellers and manufacturers resulting from damage
awards against them for injuries incurred more than 10 years from
initial purchase or 11 years from manufacture of defective products.”71
In contrast, a few years earlier the same court had upheld the tenyear statute of repose applicable to improvements to real property
against an equal protection challenge.72 When the product liability
defendants tried to argue that the reasoning of the earlier case should
apply equally to the product statute of repose, the court disagreed,
stating that “‘[a]rchitects, contractors, engineers, and inspectors . . . in most cases do not have continuing control over or
involvement with the maintenance of the improvement after its initial
construction,’” but a “‘materialman provides manufactured goods and
should be held accountable under the general tort rules governing
liability for defects in those products.’”73
A few litigants have been successful with other constitutional
arguments. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
statute of repose for improvements to real property violated both the
state constitution’s prohibition against special legislation and its open
courts provision.74 In so ruling, the Kentucky court stated that while
“a majority of the states have upheld the construction industry’s
statute of repose against attack on constitutional grounds,” the
68.

Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H. 1983).

69.

Id. at 295.

70.

Id.

71.

Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 611 N.W.2d 168, 172 (N.D. 2000).

72.

Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733, 738 (N.D. 1988) (citing
N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-44(1)(c) (2016)).

73.

Dickie, 611 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 738).

74.

Perkins v. Ne. Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 817 (Ky. 1991) (discussing Ky.
Const. §§ 14, 54, 59 & 241).
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Kentucky state constitution mandated its finding of a violation.75 The
court then punctuated its decision with an editorial comment: “If that
places us in a statistical minority, we can only commiserate with the
citizens of other states who do not enjoy similar protection.”76
Those courts finding constitutional violations have emphasized
the lack of evidence that statutes of repose achieve their legislative
policy goals. But for the most part, as the Kentucky Supreme Court
noted, statutes of repose have withstood constitutional challenges.77
Some state legislatures have recognized the problems that statutes of
repose create for plaintiffs with latent illness claims and have taken
action—usually on an ad hoc basis—to minimize or eliminate those
problems, but these efforts have lacked a comprehensive and effective
approach.
B.

Legislative Revisions

Attempts to solve the problems of repose statutes for latent illness
plaintiffs are evident in both product liability legislation and statutes
addressing improvements to real property, but to date these attempts
have fallen short. In some states, the problems are compounded by
the multiple identities of some substances as both products and
releases into the environment during and after property improvements.78 For example, lead may be harmful as a product component,79
75.

Id. at 818.

76.

Id.

77.

See, e.g., Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the Tennessee product liability statute of repose does not violate
the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution or
the state constitutional prohibition of impairment of contracts); Mercado v.
Baker, 792 P.2d 342, 343–44 (Idaho 1990) (holding that the Idaho product
liability statute of repose does not deny equal protection of the law or violate
the open courts provision of the state constitution, nor is it unconstitutionally
vague); Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194,
1200–01 (Utah 1999) (holding that the Utah construction statute of repose
did not violate the open courts provision of the state constitution because the
legislature clearly identified the “social evils” the statute was intended to
address).

78.

This multiple identity issue has led some states to explicitly exclude defective
products from the scope of their real property improvement statutes of repose.
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.10.055(b)(1)(E) (2007) (excluding defective
products); D.C. Code § 12-310(b)(3) (2001) (excluding “any manufacturer
or supplier of any equipment or machinery or other articles installed in a
structure upon real property”); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.202(2)(b)(2) (2016)
(excluding defective products); see also Buttz v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 557 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 1996) (holding that asbestos used for a real
property improvement was a product, and not subject to the statute of
repose, because the plaintiff’s exposure occurred before the asbestos-containing
product was attached to the real property). But see S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-
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and also when released into the environment at certain levels, resulting in non-product tort claims such as nuisance.80 Furthermore,
strict construction of statutes of repose has achieved inconsistent and
illogical results. Examples abound, and, at their most complex, a
state’s statutory clusters create a legal Gordian knot.
Some states have excluded from repose a single substance or
several substances known to cause latent illness and to which a
plaintiff must have been exposed to avoid repose.81 These statutes are
often construed very narrowly and to the detriment of plaintiffs, as a
Tennessee case illustrates.82 The same Tennessee statute of repose
that thwarted the plaintiff in Montgomery83 contains an exception for
asbestos exposure and silicone gel breast implants.84 This provision
has been applied strictly—some might say mercilessly. In Adams v.
Air Liquide America,85 the court affirmed the dismissal of a case
brought by a sandblaster who suffered from silicosis and silica-related
lung cancer.86 The Tennessee court determined that silica was
640(9) (2017) (including within the repose period actions against “owners or
manufacturers of components, or against any person furnishing materials” for
the improvement).
79.

See, e.g., Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 134 So. 3d 706, 712
(Miss. 2014) (denying summary judgment to the defendant in a product
liability action because a material question of fact existed as to whether the
plaintiff was exposed to the defendant’s lead paint product).

80.

See, e.g., Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d 589,
605–06 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (denying the local and state officials’ motions to
dismiss in an action arising from lead contamination of the public water
supply in Flint, Michigan).

81.

See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.10.055(b)(1)(A) (2007) (excluding injury from
“prolonged exposure to hazardous waste” from the construction repose
statute); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(e) (West 2013), amended by
2017 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 17-97 (West) (excluding injury from asbestos);
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-214(f) (West 2011), amended by 2014 Ill.
Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-1131 (West) (excluding discharge of asbestos into the
environment from the real property improvements repose statute); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (West 2012) (excluding asbestos and silicone gel
breast implants from the product liability repose statute). Other states have
special, longer statutes of repose for specific exposures. See, e.g., Idaho
Code § 5-243 (2010) (providing a thirty-year repose period for ionizing
radiation injuries).

82.

See Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 465 (6th Cir. 2009).

83.

See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text.

84.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (West 2012).

85.

No. M2013–02607–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 6680693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25,
2014).

86.

Id. at *6.
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sufficiently distinguishable from asbestos to receive different
treatment under the statute of repose.87 The plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of the statute of repose on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution88
and the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution.89
The court held that the state legislature had a rational basis for
distinguishing asbestos and silicone breast implants from other
substances covered by the statute of repose.90 Among other things, the
court noted that while asbestos had been designated a toxic
substance, silica had not, and that while silicosis is uniquely
occupational in nature, asbestosis may affect nonworkers exposed in
homes, schools, and other locations.91 Accordingly, the court rejected
the constitutional claims.92 Had the court ruled the other way,
however, its decision easily would have been supported by substantial
medical and scientific evidence of similarities between asbestos disease
and silica disease. Both are typically workplace dust exposures, and
either may cause both non-malignant obstructive lung disease and
forms of lung cancer.93 The court’s decision was purely policy-based
87.

Id.

88.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

89.

Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 8.

90.

Adams, 2014 WL 6680693, at *6; see also Wyatt v. A-Best Prods. Co., 924
S.W.2d 98, 106−07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the asbestos
exception withstood an equal protection challenge). In Wyatt, the court
reasoned that even if extending the exception in the statute of repose to all
latent injuries would have been a better means of addressing the issues raised,
there is no requirement that the legislature select the best or most perfect
option, only a rational option. The court concluded that “we cannot say that
the General Assembly’s decision to classify asbestos-related claims differently
from other latent-injury claims is so patently arbitrary as lacking any rational
basis.” Id. at 106.

91.

Adams, 2014 WL 6680693, at *2. While asbestos is listed on the federal
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, silica is not. Toxicological
Profile for Asbestos, Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease
Registry (Sep. 2001), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp.asp?id=30&
tid=4 [https://perma.cc/5X52-BF9Q].

92.

Adams, 2014 WL 6680693, at *6.

93.

Raed A. Dweik & Peter J. Mazzone, Occupational Lung Disease, Cleve.
Clinic Ctr. for Continuing Educ. (Aug. 2010), http://www.
clevelandclinicmeded.com/medicalpubs/diseasemanagement/pulmonary/occupati
onal-lung-disease/ [https://perma.cc/UGB8-G9UN]. Although the court was
correct that silica exposure occurs most commonly in the workplace, it may be a
threat beyond the workplace as a component of hazardous particulate matter
emanating from construction sites and other locations. See Particulate Matter
(PM) Basics, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, https://www.epa.gov/
pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics
[https://perma.cc/5SWP-YE5J]
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and reflects the tenacity of the original justifications for repose
statutes.
Such inconsistencies and incremental steps are apparent
elsewhere, where designating one or a couple of substances for exclusion has created a jumble of separate rules and disparate
treatment. Alaska’s construction statute of repose expressly excludes
from its scope “prolonged exposure to hazardous waste,”94 but not
exposure to other substances capable of causing latent illness. New
Hampshire excludes from its eight-year repose period for real property
improvements claims related to “nuclear power generation, nuclear
waste storage, or the long-term storage of hazardous materials.”95
Some states exclude only asbestos product liability claims and claims
arising from silicone gel breast implants from the statutory period.96
In Connecticut, the legislature has extended the repose period for
asbestos-based product actions from the state’s ten-years-fromdelivery period to eighty years from last exposure for personal injury
claims and thirty years from last contact for property damage
claims.97 Idaho has enacted a special repose period for injuries due to
ionizing radiation. The ordinary product liability repose period in
Idaho is ten years from the time of delivery and sets up a presumption that the useful safe life of the product begins at delivery and ends
ten years later.98 The special statute of repose for injuries due to
ionizing radiation extends the repose period from ten to thirty years
from “the last occurrence to which the injury is attributed.”99
The courts are tasked with interpreting statutes of repose, and the
recent history of Indiana’s asbestos-product repose statute reveals just
how tangled the interactions between the legislature and the courts
may become. Indiana has been involved in an ongoing debate over
whether its product statute of repose applies only to the sale of raw
asbestos or includes within its scope the sale of products containing
asbestos. The Indiana general product statute includes a repose provision of ten years from “delivery of the product to the initial user or
(last updated Sept. 12, 2016); Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health,
Silica, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention http://www.
cdc.gov/niosh/topics/silica/ [https://perma.cc/DD35-DFCY].
94.

Alaska Stat. § 09.10.055(b)(1)(A) (2007).

95.

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-b(V)(b) (2010).

96.

See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.907(2) (2015) (asbestos); id. § 30.908(2)
(silicone breast implants); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (2012) (both).

97.

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(e) (West 2013), amended by 2017 Conn.
Legis. Serv. P.A. 17-97 (West).

98.

Idaho Code § 6-1403(1)–(2) (2010).

99.

Id. § 5-243.
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consumer.”100 The legislature excluded certain asbestos claims,101 but
only those brought against “persons who mined and sold commercial
asbestos” and certain asbestos bankruptcy funds.102 In the 2003 case of
AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Ott,103 the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the
classification in the asbestos exception, which meant that actions
against defendants who sold asbestos-containing products rather than
raw asbestos, were subject to the ten-years-from-delivery general
statute of repose.104 The court further concluded that the statute was
not constitutionally infirm, as it treated plaintiffs with asbestos product liability claims in the same manner as plaintiffs with other
product liability claims.105
In a vigorous dissent in Ott, Justice Dickson lent a powerful voice
to the policy arguments for excluding latent toxic illness claims from
statutes of repose:
There are no inherent characteristics that distinguish workers
with asbestos-related diseases caused by exposure to raw
asbestos from those with the same diseases brought about by
exposure to manufactured products containing asbestos. Thus
the unequal treatment accorded to each class cannot be
reasonably related to any inherent differences. With the
majority’s refusal to construe [the asbestos exception] to equally
treat all persons with asbestos-related diseases, the product
liability statute of repose clearly grants to persons whose
diseases derive from raw asbestos substantial privileges and
immunities that do not equally belong to identically situated
100. Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b)(2) (2017).
101. Id. § 34-20-3-2, invalidated by Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus.,
Inc., 53 N.E.3d 1160, 1168 (Ind. 2016). The statute of limitations provides
that a personal injury or property damage action based on exposure to
asbestos “must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action
accrues.” Id. § 34-20-3-2(a)(2). Accrual is based on the plaintiff’s knowledge of
either an asbestos-related injury or property damage from asbestos. Id. § 3420-3-2(b)–(c).
102. Id. § 34-20-3-2(d)(2).
103. 785 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. 2003).
104. Id. at 1073 (“We think that the language used by the Legislature represents
its conscious intent to subject to [the asbestos exception] only those persons
who produce raw asbestos—‘persons who mine[] and s[ell] commercial
asbestos’—and leave those who sell asbestos-containing products within the
ambit of [the repose statute].”).
105. Id. at 1077. The court held that the exception did not violate the equal
privileges and immunities clause of Indiana’s constitution because no
“cognizable harm” resulted from subjecting plaintiffs suing asbestos product
manufacturers to the ten-year repose statute. Id.
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persons whose diseases result from asbestos-containing products.
The constitutional violation is apparent.106

Justice Dickson’s words must have resonated with the other members
of the Indiana Supreme Court, as evidenced by its 2016 decision in
Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Division of Cooper Industries, Inc.107 The
court reflected anew on the disparate treatment of plaintiffs exposed
to raw asbestos and those exposed to asbestos-containing products,
holding that the classification violated the privileges and immunities
clause of the Indiana Constitution.108 Justice Dickson wrote the
opinion for the evenly split court.109 Not surprisingly, the key factor in
the court’s decision was that asbestos plaintiffs’ personal injuries are
identical regardless of the type of asbestos defendant—the same latent
illnesses that develop over decades, often with a protracted period in
which the plaintiff is symptom-free.110 The court concluded with an
especially broad statement recognizing the special problems of all
plaintiffs with latent illness claims: “As a result, the Product Liability
Act statute of repose does not apply to cases involving protracted
exposure to an inherently dangerous foreign substance . . . .”111
The Myers decision potentially extends beyond asbestos to all
other latent illness product liability claims, although the parameters
of the terms “protracted exposure[s]” and “inherently dangerous
foreign substance[s]” are unclear. What is indisputably clear is that,
absent an exception, statutes of repose create two classes of latent
illness plaintiffs—those who became sick before the repose period
expired and those whose illnesses manifested after expiration—but
reward only the former group with the ability to seek redress. Their
illnesses may be identical, caused by exposure to the same substance
106. Id. at 1083 (Dickson, J., dissenting).
107. 53 N.E.3d 1160 (Ind. 2016).
108. Id. at 1166.
109. Id. at 1162.
110. The court concluded that the disparate treatment of these two classes of
asbestos plaintiffs violated the equal privileges and immunities clause because
(1) the classification bore no reasonable relationship to “inherent
characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated class,” and (2)
although the classes were “similarly situated,” the statute impermissibly gave
one class preferential treatment over the other. Id. at 1165–66 (quoting Collins
v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994)). Because the asbestos statute
contained a non-severability clause, the court invalidated the entire statute,
although it stopped short of overruling Ott. See id. at 1168 (“While we decline
to reconsider our decision in AlliedSignal v. Ott, we find that Section 2 of the
Product Liability Act violates the Indiana Constitution.”). But the result was
effectively to overrule that case.
111. Id. at 1167.
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and exhibiting the same etiology, distinguishable only by the length of
the latency period. Taken to its logical conclusion—and illogical
result—someone who had a short exposure to the substance but
developed the illness within the repose period would be able to pursue
a claim, while someone with a substantially greater exposure whose
illness manifested after the expiration of the repose period would be
barred. The open question in Indiana is whether Myers solves this
problem, in whole or in part, for injuries other than asbestos.
Myers may not be the end of the Indiana saga, however. The ink
had barely dried on the Myers decision when a bill was introduced in
January 2017 in the Indiana House that would repeal the asbestos
exception and apply the repose statute to all asbestos claims,
regardless of the defendant.112 If the legislature enacts a version of the
proposed House bill, that would constitute a rejection of the Myers
court’s recognition of the unique problems of latent illness plaintiffs.
The cycle of challenges would likely begin again. At the present time,
the Indiana Supreme Court’s broad statement on latent illnesses
strongly suggests that the court would reach the same result in future
cases involving exposure to toxic products other than asbestos.
The Indiana example shows the state courts parsing a statute that
has outlived both its rationality and its practicality. The dance between the legislature and the courts culminated in the only logical
and humane result—though that result may be temporary, depending
on the actions of the legislature. The process leading to that result
was incremental and painfully slow. The tenacity of the legislative
interests underlying the statute of repose accounts for such a politicized and protracted process of reform.
In a broader context, the Indiana example demonstrates that
many state legislatures lack an understanding of the universal
characteristics of latent toxic illness and the unique challenges experienced by latent illness plaintiffs—or they are simply willing to ignore
those hardships and cater to certain economic interests instead. The
various substances excluded from some states’ repose periods113 tend
to be those that have either generated the most litigation or received
the most publicity in the particular jurisdiction, which is just a
variation of the squeaky wheel adage. The reality is that all latent
illnesses, regardless of the exposures causing them, present the
identical legal challenges for plaintiffs confronted with statutes of
repose.
Statutes of repose for claims related to improvements to real
property also have been subjected to similar desultory treatment, as
illustrated by a handful of cases under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin
112. H.B. 1276, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017).
113. For examples, see supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
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statute of repose provides that an action must be commenced no later
than ten years after the “substantial completion of the improvement
to real property” on which the action is based.114 Asbestos defendants
seized upon this statute to defend personal injury actions brought by
plaintiffs who were exposed to asbestos while working in a variety of
construction and remediation settings. In Peter v. Sprinkmann Sons
Corporation,115 a Wisconsin appellate court allowed an asbestos
personal injury action to go forward because the plaintiff’s decedent
had been exposed to asbestos while working on repairs to real
property, not on improvements. The statute explicitly excludes repairs
from its scope.116 The court concluded that the decedent’s work
making routine repairs to insulation on machine pipe did not constitute “improvements to real property” within the meaning of the
statute of repose.117 In Ahnert v. Employers Insurance Company,118 a
federal court, applying the same Wisconsin provisions, stated that the
exclusion of repairs from the repose provision “is reasonable because
improvements to real property have a completion date whereas
regular repairs and maintenance can continue ad infinitum.”119 In the
context of latent illness cases, however, the distinction between
repairs and improvements is virtually meaningless. Developing mesothelioma in the course of work on real property has the same effects

114. Wis. Stat. § 893.89(1) (2015–16).
115. 860 N.W.2d 308 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015).
116. Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(c) (2015–16) (stating that the statute of repose “does
not apply to . . . damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance,
operation or inspection of an improvement to real property.”).
117. Peter, 860 N.W.2d at 315. The court relied upon a distinction between
“improvements” and “maintenance and repairs” that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had adopted in several earlier cases. See, e.g., Kohn v. Darlington
Cmty. Schs., 698 N.W.2d 794, 815 (Wis. 2005) (“Owners and occupiers are
protected to the extent they are involved in the actual improvement of the
property. They are not protected for post-improvement conduct, such as
negligent inspection or maintenance of the improvement.”); see also Brezonick
v. A.W. Chesterton Co., No. 2014AP2775, 2015 WL 9283609, at *7 (Wis.
App. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant on
the ground that the plaintiff’s decedent was exposed to asbestos while
engaged in repair and maintenance work within the meaning of the statute of
repose).
118. No. 13-C-1456, 2016 WL 97612 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2016).
119. Id. at *6. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the statute of
repose was unconstitutional as applied to asbestos-related disease claims. Id.
at *6 n.4 (citing Kohn, 698 N.W.2d at 818 (Wis. 2005)).
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on the worker’s health whether the work could be categorized as an
improvement to property or repairs and maintenance.120
North Carolina’s pastiche of repose statutes tells another tale of
the inadequacy of an incremental approach to latent illness claims.
The state’s general statute of repose for personal injuries or property
damage provides that “no cause of action shall accrue more than 10
years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the
cause of action.”121 A separate repose statute, which apparently overrides the general repose statute, applies to claims arising from “any
alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product;” repose in these
cases occurs twelve years from “initial purchase for use or consumption.”122
A third statute, which by its terms modifies the ten-year general
tort statute of repose, carves out an exception for claims arising from
groundwater contamination:
The 10-year period . . . shall not be construed to bar an action
for personal injury, or property damages caused or contributed
to by groundwater contaminated by a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant, including personal injury or property
damages resulting from the consumption, exposure, or use of
water supplied from groundwater contaminated by a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant.123

This exception was enacted in the wake of the 2014 United States
Supreme Court decision in CTS Corporation v. Waldburger,124 where
the Court considered whether a discovery statute of limitations in the
federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”)125 preempted application of the North
120. Interestingly, Wisconsin recognizes these inequities in its product liability
statute of repose. The statute imposes a repose period of 15 years from the
time of manufacture, but expressly excludes claims based upon latent illness.
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(5) (2015–16) (“This subsection does not apply to an
action based on a claim for damages caused by a latent disease.”); see infra
notes 171–176 and accompanying text. The statute also contains an exception
for negligence and breach of warranty claims. Wis. Stat. § 895.047(6)
(2015–16). But the legislature has not taken the same approach for real
property improvement actions.
121. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) (2015).
122. Id. § 1-46.1.
123. Id. § 130A-26.3. The statute defines “hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant” as “the concentration of the hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant exceed[ing] a groundwater quality standard set forth in 15A
NCAC 2L.0202.” Id.
124. 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).
125. 42 U.S.C § 9658 (2012). CERCLA is also known as the Superfund statute.
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Carolina statute of repose in a state-law nuisance claim arising from
toxic chemical contamination.126 In its far-reaching decision, the
Supreme Court held that while the CERCLA discovery provision preempts relevant state statutes of limitations, it does not preempt state
statutes of repose,127 leaving to state legislatures and courts the task of
determining whether any extensions or exclusions apply to the repose
statute.
The groundwater exception, however, left a gaping hole.
Excluding only those illnesses caused by contaminated groundwater
was severely restrictive, regardless of any environmental policy the
statute embodied. The exception ignored identical or similar latent
illnesses caused by other types of environmental pollution—outdoor or
indoor—and excluded persons who were exposed to contaminated
groundwater prior to enactment of the exception in 2014 but whose
illnesses did not manifest until later.
One decision applying North Carolina law awkwardly attempted
to correct this omission. In Stahle v. CTS Corporation,128 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the term “personal injury” in
North Carolina’s general statute of repose did not encompass latent
disease claims.129 The court worked hard to make this distinction,
saying that while the general repose period applied to “latent injury,”
it did not apply to disease.130 As a result, plaintiffs with latent disease
claims would not be subject to the general statute of repose.131 The
Fourth Circuit offered little support for its interpretation in North
Carolina state decisions, relying mostly on a 1985 North Carolina
Supreme Court case that involved occupational disease and the statute of limitations.132 The court did not address the interaction of the
126. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2180. The North Carolina groundwater exception
applied only prospectively from the time of its enactment in 2014. See Bryant
v. United States, 768 F.3d 1378, 1385 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing McCrater v.
Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 104 S.E.2d 858, 860 (N.C. 1958)).
127. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2187–88.
128. 817 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 2016).
129. Id. at 100.
130. Id. at 104 (“North Carolina law clearly establishes that a disease is not a
latent injury.”).
131. It remains to be seen whether the Fourth Circuit’s statutory interpretation
gains traction, especially in North Carolina state courts. And, as the
concurring judge lamented, the court could not certify the question to the
North Carolina Supreme Court and was therefore without its guidance. Id. at
113–15 (Thacker, J., concurring).
132. See id. at 104 (citing Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 336 S.E.2d 66, 70–71 (N.C.
1985)). Wilder v. Amatex Corp. contained language supportive of the Fourth
Circuit’s ruling in Stahle: “Both the [North Carolina Supreme] Court and the
legislature have long been cognizant of the difference between diseases on the
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groundwater exception with the general repose statute, as the
plaintiff’s claim arose prior to the exception’s 2014 enactment. This
ongoing uncertainty highlights the frustratingly sluggish and sporadic
process of ameliorating the negative and disparate impact of these
statutes of repose in individual cases, even when that impact is
acknowledged.
As these various examples demonstrate, states seem to be
awakening to the need for substantial statute of repose reform for
latent illness claims, but most reforms have continued to lead to
contradictory or anomalous results. Sporadic and incremental efforts
are insufficient; a more comprehensive approach is necessary. Although a few states have taken more assertive steps to eliminate the
problems, as discussed in the next Part, these reforms remain
insufficient.

III. A Simple Solution Within Reach
A.

The Need for a Broad Latent Illness Exclusion

Latent illnesses are unlike other tort injuries, a distinction that
has been uniformly recognized by state legislatures and courts in statute of limitations jurisprudence. Thus, those statutes provide that an
action accrues at the time of the plaintiff’s discovery of the illness
and—in most jurisdictions—its likely cause. Why, then, do so many
states continue to apply their statutes of repose to latent illness cases?
The answer is relatively indefensible. States are concerned with protecting defendants from unpredictable future costs that may be
“undue and unlimited.”133 But, as the Utah legislature acknowledged,
the passage of time renders future injury “highly remote.”134 These
justifications are contradictory. The more remote the possibility of
litigation after a certain period of time, the less likely that “undue
and unlimited” costs will surprise defendants.135 If the likelihood of
litigation far into the future is so “remote” and “unexpected,” presumably it would be rare. What would be the harm—or the great
“social evil”—in allowing the litigation? The Alabama legislature
expressed concern that the costs of insuring remote product liability
claims would be prohibitive.136 But plaintiffs are at a distinct
one hand and other kinds of injury on the other from the standpoint of
identifying legally relevant time periods.”
133. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2012); see supra notes 32–
36 and accompanying text.
134. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(2)(d) (LexisNexis 2012).
135. Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(b).
136. Ala. Code § 6-5-500 (2014).
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disadvantage in proving their cases after a long passage of time.
Evidence of exposure may be lost or destroyed in the course of
business; witnesses may have disappeared. The longer the latency
period between exposure to a toxic substance and manifestation of
illness, the more difficult the task of proving causation, largely
because of the possibility of intervening and superseding causes.
As previously mentioned, one reason legislatures enacted product
liability statutes of repose was the expansion of liability for product
sellers under the strict product liability regime, including
abandonment of the rules of privity of contract.137 But these justifications for statutes of repose have become largely obsolete. Recent
decades have seen a contraction of strict liability, as reflected in the
Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, which espouses a
risk-utility test and safer alternative design requirement for design
defect claims138 and a straightforward negligence test for failure-towarn claims.139 Moreover, federal preemption has become an important defense in many toxic tort cases, which benefits product sellers
by precluding many product liability actions.140 In holding the New
Hampshire product liability statute of repose unconstitutional, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that “persons injured by
defective products are deprived arbitrarily of a right to sue the manufacturers responsible for those defective products by virtue of a
statute that has become entirely divorced from its underlying
purpose.”141 To the extent that outmoded policy rationales are embedded in many state statutes of repose, the statutes have outlived
their original purpose.
Another rationale for product liability statutes of repose was that
they provide added protection for sellers of products as those products
137. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. Similarly, abandonment of
privity of contract has been cited as one reason underlying statutes of repose
for claims based upon improvements to real property. See Leichling v.
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 842 F.3d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Rose v. Fox
Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906, 911−13 (Md. 1994)).
138. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) (Am.
Law Inst. 1998).
139. Id. § 2(c).
140. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Mature Product Preemption Doctrine: The
Unitary Standard and the Paradox of Consumer Protection, 60 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 95, 115–32 (2009) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence on preemption of state product liability claims); Jean
Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of Product Preemption Doctrine, 57
Ala. L. Rev. 725, 752–69 (2006) (analyzing the normative subtext of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s product liability preemption cases).
141. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 296 (N.H. 1983).
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age and deteriorate from normal use.142 Again, that rationale fails to
hold up in cases of latent injury. A latent illness plaintiff typically
was exposed to the substance causing the illness months, years, or
decades before the illness manifested in symptoms causally associated
with the exposure—in other words, at a time when the product likely
had not deteriorated. Indeed, the old-product rationale fails even
when the plaintiff’s exposure was after the repose period had expired.
Product sellers are the most knowledgeable entities about the aging of
their own products under normal use and have marketing data to
determine the potential for future liability. As a result, they can
procure sufficient liability insurance coverage and take advantage of
traditional defenses such as assumption of the risk and comparative
fault.143
Statutes of repose for real property improvements are also based
on a set of erroneous presumptions. The concept of “latent injury” in
the construction and property improvement context is traditionally
associated with latent undiscoverable conditions that may cause
accidents years later when the plaintiff encounters the condition.144
Generally, legislatures did not contemplate that illnesses would fall
within the meaning of latent injury in this context. Nor did they
contemplate the situation in which a plaintiff has an earlier exposure
or multiple exposures that triggers a disease process with physical
manifestations that appear and are diagnosable much later, after the
expiration of the repose period. The result mirrors that in toxic product liability cases, in which those whose illnesses manifested after the
repose period would be barred while persons whose identical illnesses
manifested within the repose period could maintain their claims.
Furthermore, persons whose latent illnesses arose from exposures to
substances associated with real property improvements would be
barred from suit in a way that persons exposed to the same substances by other means may not.

142. See Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law,
Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 796, 845–46 (1983).
143. See generally Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
§§ 17–18 (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (defining apportionment of responsibility,
disclaimers, and other contractual exculpations); David G. Owen,
Products Liability Law § 13.1–.4, at 792–876 (2005) (explaining the use
of contributory negligence, comparative fault, and assumption of the risk as
defenses to product liability claims).
144. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337.15 (West 2006) (running ten years from
“substantial completion” for injuries arising from a “latent deficiency”). The
legislature defined “latent deficiency” as “not apparent by reasonable
inspection,” clearly referencing the condition of the property. See id.
§ 337.15(b).
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B.

Seeking a Solution

As discussed in Part II of this Article, some state legislatures have
recognized the unfairness of applying statutes of repose to latent illness claims, but have failed to take sufficient steps to remedy the
problem. Only by enacting a broad exclusion for latent illnesses—
applicable across the board for all tort claims and consistent with the
discovery statutes of limitations—will the problems be adequately
addressed. A few states have shown a willingness to consider such a
solution, but have stopped short of a complete and comprehensive
exclusion for latent illness claims. These statutes represent a substantial improvement over the ad hoc statutes discussed earlier by
broadly focusing on latent illness claims. It is instructive to examine
their approaches as they provide insight into the state legislatures’
reticence and reveal the shortcomings of any approach short of an
absolute exclusion.
These broader approaches fall into two general categories. The
first category may best be viewed as an extension of the singlesubstance exceptions previously discussed.145 While evincing a goodfaith effort to address the pitfalls of repose for latent illness plaintiffs,
these statutes offer little more than a narrow hit-or-miss approach.
These statutes, exemplified by Iowa and Kansas, contain exceptions
for latent illness caused by exposure to “harmful materials,” which the
statutes then list.146 Using almost identical language, the “harmful
materials” are defined by both states as:
[S]ilicone gel breast implants . . . ; . . .	
  asbestos, dioxins, . . . or
polychlorinated biphenyls, whether alone or as part of any
product; or any substance which is determined to present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment by the
United States environmental protection agency pursuant to the
federal Toxic Substance Control Act . . . or by [the]
state . . . .147

Iowa includes tobacco in the list of harmful materials, but Kansas
does not.148 Although the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”)
145. See supra notes 78–116 and accompanying text.
146. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2A)(b)(1) (2017) (excepting exposure to “harmful
materials” from the general repose period of fifteen years from first purchase);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(d)(1) (2005), preempted on other grounds by
Troutman v. Curtis, 143 P.3d 74 (2006) (excepting exposure to harmful
material from the general repose period of ten years from time of delivery).
147. Iowa Code § 614.1(2A)(b)(2) (2017).
148. Id.; see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(d)(2) (2005), preempted on other
grounds by Troutman v. Curtis, 143 P.3d 74 (2006).
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could be a convenient benchmark, not all substances capable of
causing latent illness, such as prescription drugs, are regulated under
TSCA, which was rewritten and re-authorized in 2016 by the Frank
R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act.149 Moreover,
the parameters of the new TSCA have yet to be tested. Thus, as a
practical matter, using TSCA to identify excluded substances has its
own set of problems. Both Iowa and Kansas limit the exception for
latent illness to product liability claims.150 Indeed, the Iowa statute
explicitly states that the exception does not apply to latent illness
claims related to improvements to real property.151
The second category is typified by the few states that have
enacted an exception for claims alleging exposures within the repose
period followed by a disease manifestation after that time. These statutes represent a better approach than the laundry-list exceptions, but
do not adequately solve the problem. The Texas statute of repose for
product liability claims provides that “a claimant must commence a
products liability action against a manufacturer or seller of a product
before the end of fifteen years after the date of the sale of the product
by the defendant.”152 The exception to this rule for latent injuries
states:
(d) This section does not apply to a products liability action
seeking damages for personal injury or wrongful death in which
the claimant alleges:
(1) the claimant was exposed to the product that is the
subject of the action before the end of 15 years after the date
the product was first sold;
(2) the claimant’s exposure to the product caused the
claimant’s disease that is the basis of the action; and
(3) the symptoms of the claimant’s disease did not, before the
end of 15 years after the date of the first sale of the product
by the defendant, manifest themselves to a degree and for a

149. See Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L.
No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016) (amending 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601 et seq.
(2012)).
150. Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(11)(a)(3) (2017) (running eight years from the
defendant’s injury-causing action for actions arising from improvements to
real property); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(d)(1) (20005), preempted on
other grounds by Troutman v. Curtis 143 P.3d 74 (2006).
151. Iowa Code § 614.1(2A)(b)(1) (2017).
152. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.012(b) (West 2002).
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duration that would put a reasonable person on notice that
the person suffered some injury.153
This exception is deficient for several reasons.
First, ambiguous terms in the exception leave open the possibility
of a narrow interpretation. Substantial questions of fact could exist in
determining whether the plaintiff’s symptoms were of the “degree”
and “duration” to place “a reasonable person on notice.”154 Place the
person on notice of what? Subsection (3) states that it is notice “that
the person suffered some injury,” but says nothing about knowledge of
the likely cause of that injury, which is only referenced in subsection
(2).155 While this last point is relevant to the discovery statute of
limitations, rather than the statute of repose, the imprecise language
shows how easily the concepts and problems become entangled; they
are actually two distinct issues. Second, the Texas exception does not
encompass all injuries, but is limited to personal injuries and wrongful
death. Third, the exception applies only to the product liability statute of repose; the Texas statutes of repose for improvements to real
property noticeably omit any language that could be construed to
apply to latent illness.156 In fact, somewhat perversely, legislation introduced in January 2017 would amend the real property improvements repose statute to reduce the repose period from ten years to
five years.157 The best that can be said about the Texas approach is
that it allows a limited number of claims that would otherwise be
barred by repose. While Texas recognizes the timing problem of latent
illness, it does not offer a solution for the inequitable results.

153. Id. § 16.012(d); see also id. § 16.012(d-1) (“This section does not reduce a
limitations period for a cause of action described by Subsection (d) that
accrues before the end of the limitations period under this section.”). It is
noteworthy that the exception only covers claims for personal injuries and
wrongful death, not claims for property damages. The basic statute defines
“products liability action,” including a list of types of relief that may be
sought. Id. § 16.012(a)(2). Claims for property damages, personal injuries, and
wrongful death all appear on this list, so the absence of property damages in
the exception leaves no doubt that the legislature intended to omit them from
that subsection. Id. § 16.012(a)(2)(A).
154. Id. § 16.012(d)(3).
155. Id. § 16.012(d)(2)–(3).
156. See id. § 16.008 (applying the statute of repose to architects, engineers, and
others engaged in designing, planning, or inspecting the improvement); id.
§ 16.009(a) (applying the statute of repose to those engaged in the
construction of the improvement).
157. H.B. 1053, 85th Leg. (Tex. 2017).
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Nor does Florida, which has enacted a similar exception, avoid
these pitfalls. Florida’s basic product statute of repose is keyed into
both the “expected useful life” and date of delivery:
Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action for
products liability . . . to recover for harm allegedly caused by a
product with an expected useful life of 10 years or less, if the
harm was caused by exposure to or use of the product more
than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser
or lessee . . . .158

The statute declares that “[a]ll products . . . are conclusively presumed to have an expected useful life of 10 years or less.”159 The
exception for latent injury claims provides that the repose period
“does not apply if the claimant was exposed to or used the product
within the repose period, but an injury caused by such exposure or
use did not manifest itself until after expiration of the repose
period.”160 The statute is broader than the Texas statute, as it includes property damages, but does not extend to all latent illness
plaintiffs, only those whose exposures occurred within the repose
period. Like Texas, the Florida statute of repose for improvements to
real property applies its ten-year repose period to all actions, regardless of whether they involve latent injuries.161
Idaho’s product liability repose statute contains a provision that
appears on its face to be a broader latent illness exception:
The ten (10) year period of repose . . . shall not apply if the
harm was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product,
or if the injury-causing aspect of the product that existed at the
time of delivery was not discoverable by an ordinary reasonably
prudent person until more than ten (10) years after the time of

158. Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (2017).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 95.031(2)(c). See generally R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone, 190
So. 3d 1028, 1038 (Fla. 2016) (discussing the “unique problem” of latent
illness in the context of a toxic tort case). The court employed the term
“creeping disease,” which had been used in earlier Florida decisions, and
concluded that at least for the purposes of the Florida statute of limitations
“a plaintiff should not, and cannot, be required to file a cause of action before
even realizing that the cause of action exists.” Id. This view will likely guide
the court in any future decisions interpreting the exception.
161. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(c) (2017). The Kansas product liability statute
also contains an exception for “prolonged exposure.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 603303(b)(2)(D) (2005), preempted on other grounds by Troutman v. Curtis,
143 P.3d 74 (2006).
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delivery, or if the harm, caused within ten (10) years after the
time of delivery, did not manifest itself until after that time.162

This provision suffers from the same linguistic infirmities as the Texas
statute, however. For example, to be “prolonged,” must the exposure
have been continuous during and after the repose period? To satisfy
the “injury-causing aspect” requirement, is it sufficient to offer expert
evidence of a causal connection between the product and the illness,
or must the plaintiff also offer evidence of the specific defect connected to the hazard? As in Texas and Florida, the Idaho statute of
repose for improvements to real property is untouched by this exception.163
In Georgia, the product liability statute of repose—ten years from
the first sale of the product for use or consumption for actions against
manufacturers—applies to strict liability and negligence claims, but
not to failure to warn claims.164 The statute contains an exception for
negligence actions against a product manufacturer for “a disease or
birth defect.”165 One difficulty with the statute is its fragmented
nature: It applies to some product claims but not all, and to some
injuries but not others.166 Furthermore, in product liability law, the
distinction between negligence and failure to warn is in nomenclature
only,167 yet Georgia law insists on the awkward separation of these
claims for the apparent purpose of barring some of them.168 In applying the exception only to negligence actions, the legislature subjects
persons with diseases or birth defects to the statute of repose for strict
liability claims. This incongruity has the effect of enhancing the
burden of these plaintiffs, as they must prove that the manufacturer
162. Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1403(2)(b)(4) (2010).
163. Id. § 5-241.
164. Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-11(b)(2), (c) (2007).
165. Id. § 51-1-11(c).
166. See, e.g., Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999)
(stating that “it is possible to have a situation where the plaintiff is barred
from bringing a design defect claim and yet is allowed to proceed with a
failure to warn claim based upon the dangers arising from the same alleged
design defect”).
167. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(c)
(Am. Law Inst. 1998) (stating that a product is defective for failure to warn
“when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by
the seller . . . and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
product not reasonably safe”). This Section states a negligence standard.
168. See Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 213 (Ga. 1994) (holding that
negligent failure to warn claims arising from a defectively designed product
are not covered by the statute of repose).
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acted negligently if they expect to be able to bring a claim after the
repose period has expired, a task which is not ordinarily required for
strict liability claims.169
C.

A Simpler, Fairer, and More Predictable Model

What the foregoing states have in common is a good-faith effort
to minimize the problems of latent illness plaintiffs by enacting
broader exceptions that reach beyond single substances, at least in the
context of product liability actions. They employ more inclusive language, such as “harmful materials” or the generic term “disease,” to
describe the exception. But despite the progress that these statutes
represent, they remain deficient. There is, however, a simple solution.
In states determined to retain their statutes of repose,170 legislatures
should impose an absolute latent illness exclusion, for both product
liability actions and real property improvement claims. Short of a
ruling that the statute is unconstitutional, an absolute exclusion is the
only means to avoid the inequities and disparate treatment experienced by latent illness claimants.
What would such an exclusion look like? Wisconsin’s product
liability statute of repose contains a suitably broad exclusion. The
statute states that the repose period of fifteen years from the date of
manufacture “does not apply to an action based on a claim for
damages caused by a latent disease.”171 The statute makes clear that
the exclusion applies to all product liability claims and product defendants allowable in the state.172 More generally, it also contains an
absolute exclusion for negligence and breach of warranty product
claims.173 While the exclusion leaves to the courts a determination
169. The Third Restatement has brought strict liability claims much closer to
negligence claims, however, by focusing on the behavior of the manufacturer
in developing the product. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability § 2(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (stating that a product is defective
in design “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by
the seller . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe”).
170. Many of the arguments in this Article in favor of an absolute exclusion for
latent illness would apply equally to an argument to abrogate statutes of
repose more generally. That argument is beyond the scope of this Article, but
to the extent that statutes of repose embody archaic concerns, full
reconsideration is warranted.
171. Wis. Stat. § 895.047(5) (2015–16).
172. Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)–(2) (2015–16) (providing, with some provisos, for a
variety of strict liability claims against product manufacturers, sellers, and
distributors).
173. Id. § 895.047(6).
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whether the plaintiff’s illness was within the legislature’s contemplation of “latent disease,” it avoids the line drawing, linguistic
acrobatics, and counter-intuitive results associated with so many
other statutes.
Not even Wisconsin, however, has extended the exclusion to its
statute of repose for improvements to real property.174 Yet the same
problems and inconsistencies exist for latent illness plaintiffs who may
bring their actions past the time of repose set by those statutes.
Potential plaintiffs are at risk for identical illnesses, regardless of
when they may manifest. To discriminate against those plaintiffs who
develop their illnesses past the repose period is manifestly unfair.
Plaintiffs with latent illnesses caused by contamination from an improvement to real property have as much reason as product liability
plaintiffs to be allowed to maintain their claims regardless of the time
of diagnosis or manifestation. These plaintiffs most likely have had no
control over the circumstances that gave rise to their exposure and
injury. While the design and building defendants may have relinquished control years earlier, these defendants are in possession of the
information to assist courts and juries in identifying the defect and
determining whether causation is met.175 An underlying premise of
these repose statutes is that as time passes, it is more likely that some
intervening action or lack of proper maintenance by the property
owner was the cause of the injury. This premise is evidenced by the
fact that claims against property owners are commonly excepted from
the statute of repose.176 But latent injuries may also be the fault of
those who created the improvement and along with it the original
defect; and the defect may not be detectable to the property owner in
the ordinary course of using the land and structures. Allowing injured
persons to bring actions against both the owners and the parties
responsible for creating the improvement would ensure that all the
circumstances of the injury are fully addressed and would make available more pockets for settlement or verdicts, assuming the plaintiffs
are able to prove their cases after a long passage of time. Logic and
tort principles dictate that if fault is shared among two or more responsible parties, then liability should also be allocated among those
parties, unless their contractual agreements provide otherwise.
Compelling public policies also support an absolute exclusion.
Product sellers who are required to answer to future plaintiffs will be
encouraged to keep better track of their products through post-market
174. See id. § 893.89; see supra notes 113–119 and accompanying text.
175. The design and building defendants are certainly in a superior position to the
injured plaintiff to provide information on the defect. In most cases they will
be in an equal or superior position to the landowner as well.
176. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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surveillance, assure strict compliance with safety regulations, and buy
adequate insurance. Their costs would be incorporated into the costs
of doing business using the traditional mechanisms of liability insurance and appropriately pricing their products. But in the digital era of
the twenty-first century, those mechanisms and the available information to assess them are more sophisticated than ever imagined
when statutes of repose were first deemed necessary. If the potential
for liability many years or decades into the future is unlikely—due to
the probability of missing evidence and the difficulty of proving
causation—nothing should prevent insurance companies from
appropriately pricing their liability insurance products, especially
considering the wide availability of big data in the insurance industry.
Although there is little to prevent surprise mass litigation, the same
may be said at any point in time, including soon after the pro–duct
has been sold.177 Moreover, at least some costly mass litigation could
have been prevented or minimized if defendants had only acknowledged available studies and acted upon that knowledge at an early
date. The extent of asbestos and tobacco litigation may appear to
have been unanticipated, but sellers of both products had reason to
know decades earlier that their products were harmful.178 The goal of
deterrence is more properly served by the possibility of litigation than
by immunity from suit.
If latent illness plaintiffs are excluded from statutes of repose for
real property improvements, potential design and building defendants’
dealings with subcontractors and suppliers of materials will become
more important, presumably resulting in safer design and construction
in the first instance. Transparently negotiated indemnification clauses
in their contracts with their subcontractors and with the landowners
financing the project—including an explicit understanding that liability may stretch into the future for certain injuries that are not easily
177. See generally, In re Takata Airbags Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1324
(S.D. Fla. 2016) (addressing a federal multi-district motor vehicle airbag
litigation).
178. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089−90 (5th Cir.
1973) (holding that the manufacturers’ status as experts required them to be
aware of the existing studies on the danger of asbestos, conduct their own
studies, and warn users of the foreseeable dangers); see also, Jean Macchiaroli
Eggen, The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health: Lessons From a
Century of Cigarettes, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 561, 586−94 (2008) (discussing the
epidemiological studies on smoking in the context of their impact on toxic tort
litigation). See generally Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette Century:
The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product That
Defined America (2007) (discussing the hold that the tobacco industry has
had on the American public despite the many studies demonstrating the
hazards of smoking).
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discoverable—should clarify the understandings of the parties regarding the extent of liability the clauses cover.
Plaintiffs are at the mercy of state legislatures in any event. The
legislators are more beholden to special interests and politics than the
members of the judicial branch.179 Even though state judges are likely
to be elected, the rules of procedure, evidence, and professional responsibility are designed to even the playing field among adversaries
to the greatest possible extent. But state legislators have fewer
constraints and may be swayed by business, insurance, and other
corporate interests and monetary contributions in formulating legislation. Statutes of repose clearly reflect this distinction.

Conclusion
Statutes of repose were enacted to protect defendants from stale
claims, with little or no consideration of fairness to plaintiffs who
developed latent illnesses that were undetectable until after the repose
period expired. The fact that some states have carved out an exception to their repose statutes for asbestos-related disease or other latent
illnesses demonstrates that states are well aware of the special disability their statutes of repose impose upon latent illness plaintiffs.
Constitutional challenges to statutes of repose have had some success,
but many states remain tenaciously committed to protecting certain
business interests regardless of the consequences to injured parties.
Decades ago, states revised their tort statutes of limitations by
enacting discovery rules whereby a claim accrued only when the plaintiff knew of the injury and the likely cause. These revised statutes of
limitations acknowledged the unique predicament of plaintiffs who
suffer from latent illnesses. In contrast, however, many states have
retained their statutes of repose, in whole or in part, notwithstanding
the obsolescence of the premises and policies on which the statutes are
based. Ad hoc efforts to accommodate toxic tort plaintiffs have not
resolved the problem and instead have created various classifications
with disparate treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs. It is time to
fully recognize the fundamental unfairness of these statutes of repose
in this context. States should enact an absolute exclusion to their tort
statutes of repose for latent toxic claims.

179. See McGovern, supra note 61, at 431.
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